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Abstract
A range of alternative media outlets focusing on criticizing immigration politics and mainstream media have emerged
in Sweden in recent years. Although they have quite different ideological profiles, they share a clear and critical focus on
immigration andmainstream journalistic representations of reality. Their message is thatmainstreammedia conceal or dis-
tort information about negative societal and cultural consequences of immigration and that mainstream journalists have
teamed up with the political elites and engage in witch-hunts of critics, while ignoring abuses by those in power. Such
media outlets (especially online participatory media) need to be analyzed in the light of their position as self-perceived
correctives of traditional media. There has been a remarkable surge of alternative media in Sweden with these traits in
common during the past few years, and it is important to be able to discuss these media together as a phenomenon, while
at the same time taking their differences into account. In relation to this, I argue that the notion of anti-systemness is use-
ful in discussions of the impact these alternative media may (or may not) have on public discourse. In the article, I present
a matrix that distinguishes between different types of anti-systemness: ideological anti-systemness and relational anti-
systemness. The article therefore mainly presents a theoretical argument, rather than empirical findings, with the aim of
pointing to a way forward for research about alternative media.
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1. Introduction
Not long ago, there were great expectations among
media scholars as well as public intellectuals and de-
baters about howparticipatory aspects of journalismand
news production, especially through social media and
the web 2.0, could change public discourse in positive,
more inclusive and, therefore, democratically beneficial
ways (Deuze, Bruns, & Neuberger, 2007; Jenkins, 2008;
O’Reilly, 2005). Giving the grassroots voice and visibility
was especially pointed out as a promising aspect of par-
ticipatory and citizen journalism (Domingo et al., 2008).
Now, after more than a decade of web 2.0 reality, there
seems to be more talk of populism than grassroot par-
ticipation and a growing concern about fake news, hate-
speech and propagandistic micro-targeting in online par-
ticipatory channels (Anderson & Revers, 2018; Quandt,
2018). Alternative and participatory media are increas-
ingly described as threats to the system, rather than as
promising and reinvigorating reformers in a time of wan-
ing enthusiasm for democratic engagement. After Brexit
and Donald Trump’s unexpected victory in the American
presidential election of 2016, analysts and researchers
were collectively left scratching their heads, wondering
what mistakes were made in the many analyses and pre-
dictions that preceded both elections.
In the self-examination that followed, many explana-
tory models emerged. One in particular has been re-
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peated again and again as a mantra: the gap between
societal elites and the “Average Joe” must have be-
come so great that the elites lack contact with com-
mon people and fail to understand how they think, and
what problems really concern them. American journal-
ists seemed shocked that Trump’s aggressive rhetoric tar-
geting “mainstream media” seemed to have resonated
with a large number of people (Barbaro, 2016). Even
more unpleasant tomany journalists was the insight that
alternative news sites such as Breitbart News, which sup-
ported Trump actively during the campaign, proved to
have an underestimated reach despite its reputation as a
dubious playground for various factions of the American
so called “alt-right”. Clinton’s campaign also contributed,
paradoxically, to the impact of the “alt-right” by calling it
out as a major opponent (Gourarie, 2016).
The fact that journalists in themajor newspapers and
the radio and TV channels seemed to be regarded by
many citizens as part of the establishment and found
themselves accused of being corrupt, fettered, leftist and
back-tied by pledged allegiances to political correctness
came as a cold shower for many who had actually seen
themselves as “watchdogs” in relation to power, as the
people’s advocates.
A common denominator among many on the “right”
side of the ideological spectrum (far-right as well as right-
wing populists andmanymoderate conservatives) is that
their narratives often criticize “mainstream media” for
being biased in favor of liberal/leftist perspectives, un-
critical of those in power and out of touch with ordinary
people. At the same time, a host of “alternative media”,
often with a focus on criticism of liberal immigration pol-
itics and a harsh tone against mainstreammedia, has be-
come an important factor in public discourse in many
western countries. This article is about how such politi-
cally and ideologically driven alternativemedia affectme-
dia as a system for public discourse throughout the west-
ern world.
It is becoming more and more evident that alterna-
tive right-wingmedia are increasingly relevant in the field
of political, as well as ideological and cultural communi-
cation (Nagle, 2017). It is also clear that the rapid emer-
gence of phenomena such as the so called “alt-right” on-
line movement has given rise to surprise and confusion
(Gourarie, 2016). I argue that some of this confusion, at
least in terms of scholarly attempts to come to grips with
it, has to do with a discrepancy between the dominant
theories about alternative media and alternative media
as they actually are.
Scholarly work about alternative media has in
essence taken its cue from Gramsci and the notion of
hegemony. Alternative media is in such a setting seen as
a liberating force, empowering and giving voice to groups
who suffer from marginalization in the hegemonic dis-
course of mainstream “bourgeois” media. Historically,
the phrase “mainstream media” has been used mostly
by left-wing debaters, such as Noam Chomsky (1997)
and by media scholars; “alternative media” has long
been considered the embodiment of a dream about giv-
ing ordinary citizens a way of speaking back to power
(see, e.g., Atton, 2015; Bailey, Cammaerts, & Carpentier,
2007; Lievrouw, 2011; Pajnik & Downing, 2008). Much
research has therefore focused on activist uses of me-
dia (Penney & Dadas, 2014). Researchers have been re-
luctant to talk about right-wing populist, far-right ac-
tivists or conservative criticism of the “politically correct”
and “leftist” mainstream media using existing theoreti-
cal frameworks, although there are exceptions. Downey
and Fenton (2003, p. 197), for example, pointed out that
“it would be clearly a mistake to ignore the construction
of right-wing counter-publics”, and both Downing, Ford,
Gil and Stein (2001) and Atton (2006) have approached
these phenomena, albeit with a specific focus on the
extreme-right and with a normative stance. In this arti-
cle, I view alternative media in light of the current me-
dia landscape, marked by polarization and culture wars
(Nagle, 2017). I argue that it would be beneficial if theo-
retical assumptions about alternative media were valid,
irrespective of the media’s ideological orientation. It is
also necessary to view opposing media channels, espe-
cially online participatory media in the light of their po-
sition as self-perceived correctives of traditional main-
stream media, presenting alternative interpretations of
political and social events. This motive is particularly ap-
parent in alternative media that is critical of immigra-
tion politics and the perceived threat of Islamization of
western countries—although the main focus and level
of “anti-systemness” (Capoccia, 2002) varies greatly be-
tween different actors. While some can be extreme and
incite to violence, others can be moderate and reason-
able (Holt, 2016a). Some are outspokenly anti-system,
others are not—but may still have a polarizing effect on
the media landscape. Yet others may show no signs of
anti-systemness.
Thus, this article seeks to nuance the discussion of
how alternative media—especially those with ideologi-
cal/political agendas that clash with predominant values
of the mainstream media—affect public discourse. I in-
troduce a theoretical distinction between two different
types of anti-systemness: ideological and relational. This
framework is designed to work on any alternative media,
regardless of political/ideological orientation, but is ex-
emplified using Swedish alternative media that are crit-
ical of the country’s immigration policy, building on in-
sights from previous research (Holt, 2016a). This frame-
work is important, because it enables a focused discus-
sion of specific cases and makes it easier to identify al-
ternative media that qualify as “anti-system” and those
that do not. The argument is in essence theoretical with
the aim of informing and inspiring future research.
1.1. Media Distrust and Alternative Media
Expressions of skepticism and suspicion of mainstream
media are heard in many places throughout Europe and
the USA these days. “Lügenpresse” [“the lying press”]
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was, for example, a common slogan in the PEGIDA
marches in Dresden, Germany, and elsewhere (Haller &
Holt, 2018; Holt & Haller, 2017). Hegemonic mainstream
media are seen to conceal or distort information that
does not fit the “politically correct” agenda. In Sweden,
right-wing movements, ranging from parties such as the
Sweden Democrats (SD) to more extreme think-tanks
such as Motpol.nu, raise criticism along these lines, al-
though their approaches and lines of reasoning vary
greatly (Holt, 2016a). They voice media skepticism, dis-
trust and criticism in what might be termed immigration-
critical counter-publics (Downey & Fenton, 2003). Tsfati
(2003) definesmedia skepticism as a sense of “alienation
and mistrust toward the mainstream media”. It involves
the “feeling that journalists are not fair or objective in
their reports about society and that they do not always
tell the whole story”, and that mainstream journalists
“will sacrifice accuracy and precision for personal and
commercial gains” (Tsfati, 2003, p. 67).
This is hardly to suggest that media criticism is dan-
gerous or bad in itself. However, if certain groups in so-
ciety choose to abstain from participation in the regular
mainstream platforms of public discourse (which are nor-
mally considered as the commons, the “agora”) and in-
stead entrench themselves in counter-publics where dis-
courses of alienation and mistrust in conventional demo-
cratic channels are fostered and amplified, it can be
problematic from a democratic perspective (Kobayashi
& Ikeda, 2009; Sunstein, 2007). Firstly, it reveals that
some people feel that they cannot participate on equal
terms and choose alternative platforms outside the con-
ventional news providers. Secondly, it can become an ob-
stacle to deliberation between conflicting parties, which
seriously challenges the democratic system.
The Swedish example is especially interesting. Sup-
port for the right-wing populist party, the SD, was long
significantly lower than the support for similar parties in
neighboring countries. But since the 2010 election, when
they first received enough votes to be represented in par-
liament, support for the party has grown rapidly (from
5.7% 2010 to 14% 2015 and in some recent polls around
20%). During this period, the number and nature of scan-
dals reported in the media about members of this party
outnumber those involving members of other parties by
far (Ekman &Widholm, 2014). SD have built a lot of their
rhetoric around framing themselves as henpecked out-
siders, without a fair chance in mediated political de-
bates (Hellström&Nilsson, 2010). The claim is that main-
stream media has put a lid on the debate about immi-
gration, ostracizing critical opinions (Holt, 2017). Rhetor-
ically, this has worked well for SD, sincemuch criticism of
the party has been easily explained awaywith references
to “media bias”. After the ruling Social Democratic party
in Sweden suddenly decided to take measures to radi-
cally reduce the high number of asylum seekers during
the 2015 migrant crisis, a growing number, even among
mainstream journalists, have argued that there is some
truth to the claim that immigration has been off limits for
serious discussion in the Swedish public sphere for fear
of being labelled racist (Truedson, 2016).
If massively negative media-coverage in the main-
stream channels has not hampered the increasing sup-
port for SD, it may be because there are other voices
available which play an important, and perhaps under-
estimated role in public discourse. There are indications
that immigration-critical alternative media (ICAM) in
Sweden have a significant reach (Borgs, 2015; Newman,
Fletcher, Kalogeropoulos, Levy, & Kleis Nielsen, 2018).
Survey data presented in the Reuters Institute Digital
News Report (Newman et al., 2018) reveal that each of
the four major ICAM in Sweden reaches “around one
tenth of the Swedish online population on a weekly ba-
sis” (Newman et al., 2018). Their readers are also clearly
more right-wing oriented than readers of the most in-
fluential mainstream media in Sweden. Furthermore,
the study reveals, their readers express much less trust
in regular news-reporting than others (Newman et al.,
2018). These sites (Fria Tider,Nyheter Idag, Ledarsidorna,
Samhällsnytt and Nya Tider) are regularly described in
mainstream media as a threat to the democratic system,
as purveyors of hate and generally troll-friendly. While
this might be true of some ICAM, it hardly holds for all
of them. The problem is that they tend to be lumped to-
gether and treated as one coordinated entity—and are
often generalized as extremists. Anti-mainstream media
rhetoric is particularly targeted and described as a threat
to freedom of speech. Some actors, such as the now
defunct YouTube channel, Granskning Sverige (Burman,
2017), actually threaten and target individual journalists;
others merely publish critical opinions and analysis. It is
therefore important to distinguish between alternative
media that actually display anti-system tendencies and
those who do not. Being critical of mainstream news is
not the same thing as promoting extreme agendas. It
is crucial for scholars to make this distinction. Why are
some groups angry with the “Lügenpresse”? How does
their anger affect public discourse on a general level? Is
this mistrust a threat to the democratic system, and does
it pose a danger to free media? If so, in what ways?
I will not be able to answer these questions here, but
I do propose a framework that I believe will aid the pur-
suit of the answers.
1.2. Alternative Media
The term “alternative media” used in scholarly research
(see, e.g., Atkinson & Leon Berg, 2012; Rauch, 2015)
aims—in broad terms—at media that challenge the
established channels and put forward alternative ap-
proaches and perspectives that contradict or diverge
from an experienced dominant discourse in the main-
streammedia (Atton, 2015; Leung& Lee, 2014). The term
does not require any particular focus but refers to all
types of media that are created and run in opposition
to what is perceived as a dominant discourse in tradi-
tionalmedia. Typically, according to Leung and Lee (2014,
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p. 341), “such alternative media often jettison the con-
ventional journalistic norms of objectivity and impartial-
ity to espouse specific political views”.
Talking about alternative media will be confusing un-
less we classify them in a way that signals an orientation
that separates them from other types of alternative me-
dia. The focus in this article rests specifically on alterna-
tive media that show a fundamentally (more or less pro-
nounced) critical attitude towards the Swedish immigra-
tion policy and its consequences as well as towards the
media establishment (Holt, 2016a, 2017). In Sweden, in
recent years, the term has been associated specifically
with immigration-critical media, characterized by an em-
phatically oppositional stance vis-à-vis both the political
and the media establishment. In the Swedish context,
the term “alternative media” refers to:
A self-assumed term that signals an opposition to tra-
ditional media (“old media”), which many of the writ-
ers in this field regard as failing to report properly
on important societal issues, for example, by avoiding
reporting on social problems related to immigration.
(Holt, 2016b, my translation)
The term “alternative media” is here somewhat prob-
lematic as such a classification is imprecise and implicitly
could give the reported media the status of equivalent,
“interchangeable” alternatives to established journalistic
media. This could of course be problematic, given the
huge difference regarding the conditions, ambitions and
resources that exist between the “alternative” and the
“mainstream”. On the other hand, several of the people
interviewed by Holt (2016a) registered some objection
to the term because it can be interpreted as a way to im-
pose a state of permanent exclusion. That is, the term
“alternative” emphasizes and consolidates a position be-
yond the mainstream, beyond the pale.
Alternative media are relevant because their exis-
tence and working methods can affect the public conver-
sation and the rest of themedia landscape and hence the
conditions for opinion formation and news consumption.
Also, epistemologically, they often pose a challenge to
mainstreammedia, since they implicitly, and often explic-
itly, challenge mainstream media’s “fake news”, while at
the same time, more often than not, they have very lim-
ited resources to perform investigative research on their
own and for the most part rely on reports from main-
stream media for what they write about (Holt, 2016a).
What is lacking in research, however, is a good way of ap-
proaching the study of this field that allows for a discus-
sion of specific alternative media (regardless of their ide-
ological/political leanings) as a phenomenon while still
taking thewide variety within this type of alternativeme-
dia in to account. Now, howmight we approach this field
of study in a manner that both views alternative media
as a phenomenon in itself and makes distinctions among
the various media? In my effort to answer this question
I have taken inspiration from theories about anti-system
parties (Capoccia, 2002). Similar to how a country’s polit-
ical landscape is affected when a new and ideologically
controversial party wins support, the media landscape is
inevitably affected when newmedia that promote stand-
points considered by others as controversial enter the
arena andwin an audience. If thesemedia, like some par-
ties, can represent positions that are harshly critical of
the political establishment and the elites and at the same
time express opinions that are very far from other actors
in the arena, some specific problems arise. The effects of
such changes are often described in terms of increasing
political polarization and challenges to the legitimacy of
the established political system (Sartori, 2005). Just as it
is possible to talk about such types of parties’ influence
on the political arena, media that display similar features
(anti-establishment rhetoric, amessage that undermines
confidence in the current order and positions far from
the rest of the media actors), contribute to increased po-
larization in the public debate conducted through media
in a society.
As for the Swedish ICAM, we can see that there are
major differences in how the various actors relate and
positions themselves to other media actors and to what
extent their legitimacy is challenged (Holt, 2016a). There-
fore, it is necessary to distinguish between the different
types of anti-systemness in a more elaborated manner.
2. Different Types of Anti-Systemness
As stated above, these alternative media channels need
to be analyzed in the light of their position as a perceived
corrective of traditional media and of constrained pub-
lic discourse. This is in line with an anti-system line of
thought (Capoccia, 2002). Anti-system attitudes can oc-
cur both to the Left and the Right, and Capoccia (2002,
drawing on Sartori, 1976), distinguishes between rela-
tional anti-systemness (how a party positions itself in re-
lation to other parties and vice versa) and ideological
anti-systemness (whether or not the ideological founda-
tion of the party includes an agenda to alter or destroy
the system; Capoccia, 2002, p. 24). It is thereby pos-
sible to discuss different types of anti-systemness and
to widen the definition beyond strictly anti-democratic
movements. Many European parties that Mudde (2014,
p. 217) calls “populist radical right parties (PRRPs)”, for ex-
ample, are not ideologically anti-democratic, but can still
show signs of relational “anti-systemness”, placing them
in the category “polarizing parties” according to Capoc-
cia (2002). I argue that such a distinction is also relevant
to the sphere of alternative media.
ICAM position themselves as contenders to, or
rebels against mainstream media’s norms and ways of
working—for example, ethical codes stipulating caution
when reporting on crimes committed by immigrants (see,
Pressens Samarbetsnämnd, 2001). Because of such re-
straints,mainstreammedia is construed as amouthpiece
of the political establishment rather than aswatchdogs in
relation to politicians. Epistemologically, ICAM also posi-
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tion themselves as exposers ofmainstreammedia’s “fake
news”. As a response to this there are now a number
of alternative media that present other interpretations
of reality, and may report in ways considered unortho-
dox by journalists in the mainstream. There is reason
to examine whether they show signs of anti-systemness
and, if so, in what ways. These media, like anti-system
parties, display anti-system characteristics to different
degrees and for various reasons: some are clearly anti-
system in the ideological sense while others who are
not still appear to be anti-system in the relational sense
(see Figure 1) by virtue of the polarizing effect they have
in relation to other media outlets. Furthermore, some
ICAM might not show any signs of anti-systemness, re-
lational or ideological, which is also important to be able
to point out. The differences between these types of anti-
systemness are illustrated below in The Alternative Me-
dia Anti-systemness Matrix (Figure 1).
Ideological anti-systemness refers to the degree of
antagonism and distrust displayed by actors in the spe-
cific alternative media toward mainstream media and
their institutions within the established media system
of a nation. Capoccia (2002) explains Sartori’s definition
of ideological anti-systemness as abiding by a belief sys-
tem that “does not share the values of the political or-
der within which it operates” (Capoccia, 2002, p. 14).
In other words, it is a stance that would abolish the
system of governance as a whole. Obviously, this rep-
resents a quite extreme position and would in relation
to media mean a vision of a completely different me-
dia system. Ideological anti-systemness might be studied
through self-descriptions, interviews and content analy-
sis of material available through the specific alternative
media (blog posts, pods, articles, YouTube clips, etc.). In
order to fulfil this criterion, it must be clear that the
view taken on mainstream media is clearly antagonistic
and excludes any hope of change or remedy of the per-
ceived ills. One example of such an outspoken position
in the Swedish case, as identified by (Holt, 2016a), is the
YouTube channel, Granskning Sverige, which regularly
interviewed journalists and politicians in a provocative
and confrontative manner and recorded the interviews
secretly and published them (often in a tendentiously
edited version). The channel clearly displays signs of ideo-
logical anti-systemness since they generally attacked and
targetedmainstream journalists and called for the whole
system to be abolished and replaced.
Relational anti-systemness refers to media that may,
but do not necessarily meet the criteria of ideological
anti-systemness, but still have an effect on other media.
Capoccia (2002, p. 14) outlines three attributes of rela-
tional anti-systemness:
• “Distant spatial location from neighboring parties”
(meaning that their views are far from even those
who could be described as closest to them), which
in turn leads to:
• “Low coalitional potential”, which in turn entails:
• “Outbidding propaganda tactics/delegitimizing
messages”.
As for parties, these three dimensions are applicable to
alternative media. Although some are not ideologically
anti-system, they may have an impeding and/or polariz-
ing effect on the media environment as a whole, similar
to the effect some parties have on the party systemwhen
other actors position themselves strongly against them,
for example through a “cordon sanitaire” or quarantine,
or by refusing to participate in the same public debates
because their views are considered unacceptable. Their
conduct can also change or erode the standards for what
is considered acceptable, especially if there is a high de-
mand for the type of content they offer. In the Swedish
case, the unique selling point of ICAM is in several cases
that they provide information about the ethnicity of crim-
inal offenders (which is generally omitted in mainstream
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Figure 1. The Alternative Media Anti-systemness Matrix. Based on Capoccia’s (2002) typology of “anti-system parties”.
The 2 × 2 matrix displays a typology of alternative media and their different forms of anti-systemness (or lack thereof) in
relation to traditional media’s positions, norms and ways of working.
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news). If this type of content is attractive to readers, and
hence constitutes a serious competitive advantage for
ICAM in relation to mainstream media, it might lead to
altered praxis in the mainstream. Such an effect is here
deemed the outcome of relational anti-systemness be-
cause it would be an effect caused by the fact that other
media adapt to new conditions imposed by the mere ex-
istence and success of the new actor (in a long-term per-
spective, however, if such a development takes place on
a large scale, it would, of course, cease to be controversial
and, as a consequence, also lose its anti-system quality).
Considering these two dimensions in a 2 × 2 matrix,
a framework appears that makes it possible to differ-
entiate alternative media based on observations about
the applicability of both notions. If a specific alternative
media displays signs of ideological as well as relational
anti-systemness, we can talk about “Anti-System alter-
native media” as in the upper left square in Figure 1.
They position themselves (ideologically) in direct oppo-
sition to the traditional media standards and function-
ing (for example by deliberately not joining the National
Press Club or the media ethical system, and by display-
ing antagonism towards mainstream media actors). Re-
lationally, they also have a direct impact on the sur-
rounding media landscape because other actors openly
renounce them (polarization), which tends to entail cov-
erage in mainstream media. The content is of such a na-
ture that it: 1) represents a real competitive factor for
mainstreammedia; and 2) would be problematic to pub-
lish within the framework of mainstreammedia because
of its controversial nature. The combination of 1) and 2)
means a possibility that they also affect the behavior of
traditional media. For example, mainstream media may
change their practices to avoid losing readers. In Swe-
den, the website nordfront.se—run by national socialist
“NordiskaMotståndsrörelsen”, or the “Nordic Resistance
Movement”—is an example that shows signs of both
ideological and relational anti-systemness. While being
outspokenly and radically anti-system in the ideological
sense, they have also managed to attract much atten-
tion frommainstreammedia actors, especially in relation
to a number of widely covered marches, most notably
the one performed close to and at the same time as the
Göteborg Book Fair in 2017. Their presence causedmuch
outrage and indignation from debaters who found it un-
acceptable to let them march at all. As an organization,
the movement (with a few hundred activists in the orga-
nization) decidedly belongs to the marginal fringe, but
their media outlet, nordfront.se has gained a lot of visi-
bility frommainstreammedia coverage of their marches
(for example, activists typically wear shields with the
organization’s web-address eye-catchingly printed on it;
see, BBCWorld, 2017). The above-mentioned YouTube
channel, Granskning Sverige, has also been the subject
of much journalistic coverage.
If, however, only the criterion of ideological anti-
systemness is fulfilled and not the relational, as in the
upper right square in Figure 1, they might be radical,
hostile and antagonistic, but since they are generally ig-
nored by other media, they can rightfully be described
as “irrelevant”, because they fail to elicit reactions and
in effect publicity. They are not relationally anti-system
in the sense that they have no direct impact on the sur-
rounding media landscape. Their content is of a nature
that would be problematic to publish within the frame-
work of mainstream media. This category includes vari-
ous blogs, social media accounts and other alternative
media outlets run by fringe groups or individuals who
simply do not cause any stir in the surrounding media
environment. A good example is the Swedish PEGIDA-
movement’s Facebook page (Holt & Haller, 2017). In
Germany, PEGIDA’s Facebook page has a large following
(Haller & Holt, 2018), and the movements activities have
caused much debate and attracted prime time media
coverage worldwide, but the Swedish branch has hardly
been noted at all, and interactions around the rare posts
appearing on the page are very few.
Moving down to the left corner square of the lower
row of the matrix, we find alternative media that are not
ideologically anti-systembut have attributes of relational
anti-systemness. These can be called “polarizing alterna-
tive media” and are not in principle (ideologically) op-
posed to the basic rules and guidelines that govern the
established media’s approach. They do not express a de-
sire to replace the whole system, but call for changes in
it. Those who take part in these media would not have
problems connecting to the media ethical system and
might actively seek membership in the National Press
Club. However, the content is of such a nature that it:
1) competes with the established media; and 2) could be
problematic to publish within the framework of the tra-
ditional media publishing channels. Their interpretation
and application of the ethical guidelines are different
from those of editors and journalists in traditional media,
but do not challenge the existing order. Relationally, po-
larizing alternative media affect the surrounding media
landscape in the same way as the anti-systemic—that is,
by mutual rejection and open antagonism (for example
they might not be accepted as members in the National
Press Club, because Club members might find the “dis-
tant spatial location” too “distant”. Secondly, they could
also in theory affect other media’s behavior. An example
from the Swedish scene here would be the blog Samhäll-
snytt (formerly Avpixlat.info), a well-known ICAM in Swe-
den. One of the main contributors, Mats Dagerlind, ap-
plied for membership in the Press Club, but was denied
entrance (Sköld, 2013) due to the fact that the blog did
not have an official publisher, which is a criterion for be-
ing accepted as member in club.
The lower right corner of the table is a residual cate-
gory for alternative media that do not meet any of the
criteria for anti-systemness. This category is important
in the context of discussing alternative media with agen-
das that are deemed as provocative and even harmful by
some, but do not qualify for any of the two notions of
anti-systemness presented in Figure 1.
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3. Concluding Remarks
The typology outlined in The Alternative Media Anti-
systemness Matrix can be useful both for selecting rel-
evant cases when studying alternative media and for
analyzing them. According to what has been described
above, it will be of special interest to look specifically at
purely “Anti-system” alternative media, with a potency
to have a significant impact on public discourse and “po-
larizing alternativemedia”,whichmight not pose a threat
to the existing system per se, but still affect the debate,
polarizing and presenting alternative agendas and inter-
pretations of events to such an extent that meaningful
discussions are difficult. Both types in the left-hand col-
umn can theoretically also have an impact on traditional
media’s behavior. “Irrelevant alternative media” can be
represented by numerous blogs and sites that present
views that are radically anti-system, but which do not
cause any reactions from other actors or pose any threat
to either the power over how reality is described or tradi-
tional media’s circulation/readership. Such sites exist in
abundance but fail to have any notable impact. Research
about “alternative media” along these lines has largely
been absent among media scholars but provides a good
framework for distinguishing different alternative media
from each other in a meaningful way and also lays the
ground for relevant comparisons to be made between
different cases.
Themain aim of this article has been to offer a frame-
work for analyzing alternative media that does not de-
pend on any specific ideological position or normative as-
sumption about the general nature of alternative media.
Since media constitute the platform through which citi-
zens in democratic society orient themselves and form
opinions in order to participate in democratic life in an
enlightenedmanner, the most important question to ask
in relation to alternative media is how they might affect
the conditions for public discourse. If they show signs
of anti-systemness (either relational or ideological, but
most potently both). They merit further scrutiny along
lines of inquiry that seek to establish the magnitude of
their possible anti-system effect on public discourse.
This framework also offers a fruitful way of putting
specific cases in perspective and avoiding generaliza-
tions.While the purely anti-systemalternativemedia can
be described as both radical and threatening to a free
and open debate and having a considerable impact on
public discourse in terms of managing to attract a lot of
attention, they might also be rather rare. More common
are probably examples of extreme and fringe alternative
media that live their lives mostly unnoticed by the vast
majority and without opportunities of staging events or
quasi-events that reward them with attention dispropor-
tionate to their size. In other words, mainstream media
might actually turn otherwise irrelevant alternative me-
dia into full-fledged anti-system alternative media by the
amount of coverage they devote to them. In cases where
provocations are laid out as bait, this has proven to be a
successful strategy (and a signum) for some alt-right ac-
tors (Gourarie, 2016).
It should also be noted that the matrix in Figure 1.
can never be used in a static way—it is designed to al-
low for the dynamic nature of public discourse through
media. Since the positions described in it are in essence
dependent on other actors (mainstreammedia) and their
positions, any momentary snapshot of the media land-
scape may become outdated after a while. Positions may
have changed on both sides (ICAM and mainstream me-
dia). For example, an ICAMwhich falls under the category
“polarizing alternative media” at one point might, due to
changed behavior, increased acceptance from other ac-
tors or normalization of theirworldviewdue to a changed
political reality, verge into the category “Not anti-system”.
Nevertheless, the matrix remains a framework in which
it is possible tomake important distinctions between spe-
cific alternative media at any given time.
3.1. Limitations and Future Research
The contribution of this article is mainly theoretical, and
the framework presented is intended to inspire future,
more empirically oriented research. The examples men-
tioned above from the Swedish scene are included as il-
lustrations, but in order to come to more valid conclu-
sions, more rigorous empirical analysis of reach, impact
and reactions from other media, as well as of attitudes
and ideology needs to be done. Also, the argumentmade
in this article does not purport to give the full answer
to the question of how alternative media impact and
affect public discourse—it highlights specific aspects of
this, namely that the relational aspects, alongside the
ideological aspects of the emergence of new alternative
media actors are important for understanding the big-
ger picture.
Conflict of Interests
The author declares no conflicts of interest.
References
Anderson, C. W., & Revers, M. (2018). From counter-
power to counter-Pepe: The vagaries of participatory
epistemology in a digital age.Media and Communica-
tion, 6(4), 24–35.
Atkinson, J. D., & Leon Berg, S. V. (2012). Nar-
rowmobilization and Tea Party activism: A study
of right-leaning alternative media. Communication
Studies, 63(5), 519–535. https://doi.org/10.1080/
10510974.2011.649442
Atton, C. (2006). Far-right media on the internet:
Culture, discourse and power. New Media & So-
ciety, 8(4), 573–587. https://doi.org/10.1177/
1461444806065653
Atton, C. (2015). The Routledge companion to alternative
and community media. New York, NY: Routledge.
Media and Communication, 2018, Volume 6, Issue 4, Pages 49–57 55
Bailey, O., Cammaerts, B., & Carpentier, N. (2007). Un-
derstanding alternative media. London: McGraw-Hill
Education.
Barbaro, M. (2016). How did the media—how did we—
get this wrong? The New York Times. Retrieved from
www.nytimes.com/2016/11/09/podcasts/election-
analysis-run-up.html
BBCWorld. (2017). Clashes at Swedish neo-Nazi rally.
BBC. Retrieved from www.bbc.com/news/world-
europe-41454707
Burman, E. (2017). Krönika: Granskning Sverige
blev för mycket—Även för Facebook [Granskn-
ing Sverige became too much—even for Face-
book]. Ekuriren. Retrieved from www.ekuriren.se/
nyhetskronikor/granskning-sverige-blev-for-mycket-
aven-for-facebook
Borgs, M. (2015). Alternativa medier vs public service.
Medium. Retrieved from medium.com/@martin
borgs/alternativa-medier-public-service-ea3110e38
4ec
Capoccia, G. (2002). Anti-system parties: A conceptual
reassessment. Journal of Theoretical Politics, 14(1),
9–35.
Chomsky, N. (1997). What makes mainstream media
mainstream. Z Magazine, 10(10), 17–23.
Deuze, M., Bruns, A., & Neuberger, C. (2007). Prepar-
ing for an age of participatory news. Journalism
Practice, 1(3), 322–338. https://doi.org/10.1080/
17512780701504864
Domingo, D., Quandt, T., Heinonen, A., Paulussen, S.,
Singer, J. B., & Vujnovic, M. (2008). Participatory
journalism practices in the media and beyond: An
international comparative study of initiatives in on-
line newspapers. Journalism Practice, 2(3), 326–342.
https://doi.org/10.1080/17512780802281065
Downey, J., & Fenton, N. (2003). New media, counter
publicity and the public sphere. New Media &
Society, 5(2), 185–202. https://doi.org/10.1177/
1461444803005002003
Downing, J. D., Ford, T. V., Gil, G., & Stein, L. (2001).
Radical media: Rebellious communication and social
movements. London: Sage.
Ekman, M., & Widholm, A. (2014). Politicians as me-
dia producers. Journalism Practice, 9(1), 78–91.
https://doi.org/10.1080/17512786.2014.928467
Gourarie, C. (2016). How the ‘alt-right’ checkmated the
media. Columbia Journalism Review. Retrieved from
www.cjr.org/analysis/alt_right_media_clinton_trump.
php
Haller, A., & Holt, K. (2018). Paradoxical populism: How
PEGIDA relates to mainstream and alternative me-
dia. Information, Communication & Society, 1–16.
https://doi.org/10.1080/1369118X.2018.1449882
Hellström, A., & Nilsson, T. (2010). ‘We are the good
guys’: Ideological positioning of the nationalist party
Sverigedemokraterna in contemporary Swedish
politics. Ethnicities, 10(1), 55–76. https://doi.org/
10.1177/1468796809354214
Holt, K. (2016a). “Alternativmedier”? En intervjustudie
om mediekritik och mediemisstro [”Alternative me-
dia”? An interview study about media criticism and
media distrust]. In L. Truedson (Ed.), Migrationen i
medierna: Men det får en väl inte prata om? (pp.
113–149). Stockholm: Institutet för mediestudier.
Holt, K. (2016b). Journalistik bortom redaktionerna [Jour-
nalismbeyond the newsrooms]? InO.Westlund (Ed.),
Människorna, medierna & marknaden. Medieutred-
ningens forskningsantologi om en demokrati i förän-
dring (pp. 403–428). Stockholm: Wolters Kluwer.
Holt, K. (2017). Media distrust: A left-wing or right-wing
specialty? Historical perspectives on today’s debate
about populism and the media. Paper presented at
the symposium Perspectives on Right-Wing Populism
and the Media: Scholarship, Journalism, Civil Society.
Munich: Center for Advanced Studies (CAS), LMUMu-
nich, Germany.
Holt, K., & Haller, A. (2017). What does ‘Lügenpresse’
mean? Expressions of media distrust on PEGIDA’s
facebook pages. Politik, 20(4), 16.
Jenkins, H. (2008). Convergence culture: Where old and
new media collide. New York, NY: New York Univer-
sity Press.
Kobayashi, T., & Ikeda, K. I. (2009). Selective exposure
in political web browsing: Empirical verification of
‘cyber-balkanization’ in Japan and the USA. Infor-
mation, Communication & Society, 12(6), 929–953.
https://doi.org/10.1080/13691180802158490
Leung, D. K., & Lee, F. L. (2014). Cultivating an active on-
line counterpublic examining usage and political im-
pact of internet alternative media. The International
Journal of Press/Politics, 19(3), 340–359.
Lievrouw, L. (2011). Alternative and activist new media.
Cambridge: Polity.
Mudde, C. (2014). Fighting the system? Populist rad-
ical right parties and party system change. Party
Politics, 20(2), 217–226. https://doi.org/10.1177/
1354068813519968
Nagle, A. (2017). Kill all normies: Online culture wars
from 4chan and Tumblr to Trump and the alt-right.
Winchester: Zero Books.
Newman, N., Fletcher, R., Kalogeropoulos, A., Levy, D.
A. L., & Kleis Nielsen, R. (2018). Reuters institute
digital news Report 2018. Retrieved from: https://
reutersinstitute.politics.ox.ac.uk/sites/default/files/
digital-news-report-2018.pdf
O’Reilly, T. (2005). What is web 2.0? Design patterns
and business models for the next generation of
software. O’Reilly. Retrieved from oreilly.com/web2/
archive/what-is-web-20.html
Pajnik, M., & Downing, J. D. (2008). Alternative me-
dia and the politics of resistance. Ljubljana: Peace
Institute.
Penney, J., & Dadas, C. (2014). (Re)Tweeting in the ser-
vice of protest: Digital composition and circulation in
the Occupy Wall Street movement. NewMedia & So-
ciety, 16(1), 74–90.
Media and Communication, 2018, Volume 6, Issue 4, Pages 49–57 56
Pressens Samarbetsnämnd. (2001). Code of ethics for
press, radio and television in Sweden. Pressens
Samarbetsnämnd. Retrieved from po.se/about-the-
press-ombudsman-and-press-council/code-of-ethics
-for-press-radio-and-television-in-sweden
Quandt, T. (2018). Dark participation. Media and Com-
munication, 6(4), 36–48.
Rauch, J. (2015). Exploring the alternative–mainstream
dialectic: What “alternative media” means to a hy-
brid audience. Communication, Culture & Critique,
8(1), 124–143. https://doi.org/10.1111/cccr.12068
Sartori, G. (2005). Parties and party systems: A frame-
work for analysis. Colchester: ECPR press.
Sartori, G. (1976). Parties and party systems. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Sköld, J. (2013). Avpixlats huvudman nekas medlem-
skap i Publicistklubben [Avpixlat’s front figure de-
nied membership in the Press Club]. Aftonbladet.
Retrieved from www.aftonbladet.se/nyheter/article
16527633.ab
Sunstein, C. R. (2007). Republic.com 2.0. Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press.
Truedson, L. (Ed.). (2016). Migrationen i medierna: Men
det får en väl inte prata om [Migration in the me-
dia: But we are not allowed to talk about that, right]?
Stockholm: Institutet för mediestudier.
Tsfati, Y. (2003). Media skepticism and climate of opin-
ion perception. International Journal of Public Opin-
ion Research, 15(1), 65–82.
About the Author
Kristoffer Holt is Associate Professor inMedia and Communication Studies at the Department ofMass
Communication andMedia, Gulf University for Science and Technology, Kuwait. Holt has done research
into alternative media, media criticism, media ethics and participatory journalism. His work has ap-
peared inNewMedia& Society, the European Journal of Communication, Information, Communication
& Society, Journalism Practice, Javnost: The Public and the Journal of Media Ethics, among others.
Media and Communication, 2018, Volume 6, Issue 4, Pages 49–57 57
